decriminalization of marijuana use in 1972.6 The final report, issued the following year, recommended a framework for drug policy that remains pertinent today. 8 think our nation's drug policy was moving in the right direction. As this Article will discuss, however, the pendulum suddenly swung in the other direction and remained there for more than twenty years. 9 This Article will give a brief historical account of drug policy and then draw out three implications of my views that bear most heavily on the subject of this conference.
I. A PRAGMATIC VIEW OF DRUG POLICY
Our nation's policy toward opiates and cocaine-and later marijuana and other so-called drugs of abuse-had its roots in the Progressive Era of the early twentieth century. [VOL. 13:7
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Harrison Narcotic Act' 2 was enacted in 1914. The premise of these statutes was that controlling narcotic drugs and making them available only for medical purposes would eradicate addiction and the problems that are associated with addiction, as well as the disordered behavior that can be associated with acute intoxication. 3 In the 1920s, the federal government took the position that maintenance treatment of addiction was not a legitimate medical use.1 4 Although the main components of this strategy were criminalization and enforcement, 5 the federal government set up two hospitals for the treatment of addiction in 1929. 16 The heavy reliance on criminal enforcement, even for users, intensified after World War II in response to an epidemic of heroin use in New York City and other major cities. 13. See 146 CONG. REC. S7193, S7203 (daily ed. July 19, 2000) (statement of Sen. Hatch) (discussing the importance of the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, among others, as "ensur[ing] that drug products [are] carefully controlled" to prevent inappropriate use of drugs other than for safe and effective purposes); 133 CONG. REC. S384 (daily ed. Jan. 6, 1987) (statement of Sen. Inouye) (recounting the historical development of heroin prohibition in the United States, noting that the Harrison Narcotics Act "banned the recreational use of heroin... to stem the growing number of opium addicts," but that the statute "left the door open for the prescription of heroin by doctors...").
14. See Joseph F. Spillane, Building a Drug Control Regime, 1919 Regime, -1930 , in FEDERAL DRUG CONTROL: THE EVOLUTION OF POLICY AND PRACTICE 26, 38-39 (Jonathon Erlen & Joseph F. Spillane eds., 2004) (discussing a series of cases in the 1920s that supported a "strict antimaintenance policy").
See RICHARD J. BONNIE & CHARLES H. WHITEBREAD II, THE MARIHUANA CONVICTION: A HISTORY OF MARIHUANA PROHIBITION IN THE UNITED STATES 18-21 (1974) (describing the Harrison
Act as a "prohibition statute" designed for "enforce[ment] against maintenance and street use," and concluding that the removal of "any legitimate source of narcotic drugs" from the medical profession resulted in criminalization of "the user's entire lifestyle").
16 
A. The Medical Approach
Under a medicalization perspective, addiction should be treated rather than punished. This position has roots going back to addiction maintenance clinics that were shut down in the 1920s. 24 In the 1960s, the therapeutic position toward addiction was also linked to a broader faith in a rehabilitative ideal-a therapeutic alternative to incarceration and punishment for the disease of crime. 25 This perspective had a distinct ideological flavor since its adherents embraced a more deterministic view of the roots of criminal behavior and a correspondingly 
B. The Non-Criminal Approach
The decriminalization position overlaps with medicalization but, as described in this Article, it is more pragmatic and less ideological. Proponents of decriminalization argued that the criminal legal framework was overextended and should be contracted. 32 This argument did not raise moral doubts about holding offenders responsible for their transgressions or imply that the underlying causes of criminal behavior are beyond their control; it focused instead on the costs of using TO REDUCE CRIME 131-37 (1973) (discussing the Commission's recommendations on reducing the scope of the criminal law, including decriminalizing drunkenness and reevaluating penalties for possession of marijuana, prostitution, pronogrphy, and gambling). s one proceeds through the criminal justice system, from district attorneys to court clinicians, the people responsible for the functioning of that system seem to be decreasingly enthusiastic about the appropriateness of criminal control and decreasingly insistent on any technique for formal control.");
[VOL. 13:7 cost-benefit, pragmatic analysis-was clearly reflected in the 1972 and 1973 reports of the National Commission on Marijuana and Drug Abuse 40 and the simultaneous reforms of national and state drug policy that were adopted during the 1970s. 41 First, the Controlled Substances Act 4 2 consolidated a patchwork of drug laws and set up an integrated regulatory framework for classifying and scheduling psychoactive drugs based on a balance between their medical utility and their risk of abuse. 43 An important policy feature of the Controlled Substances Act was that it radically reduced penalties for drug offenses that had escalated during the 1950s, reducing simple possession to a misdemeanor, grading penalties for commercial offenses, and eliminating mandatory penalties. 44 Secondly, in the wake of the Commission reports, ten states decriminalized possession of small amounts of marijuana and other consumption-related offenses.
45 Decriminalization was widely supported by a broad range of constituencies, 46 not on libertarian grounds, but rather on the pragmatic ground that the costs of criminalization outweigh its benefits. 47 The theory was that the nation's compelling goal of deterring and discouraging drug use, especially by young people, could be achieved through many other tools of social control without arresting hundreds of thousands of people and putting them in jail. 48 Thirdly, the Commission recommended-and it became federal policy during this period-that the nation make a concerted effort to provide treatment for people with addictions, and specifically to deploy the criminal justice system as an instrument of therapeutic leverage, rather than punishment, for addicted offenders. 49 Community treatment agencies were set up throughout the country to provide services to offenders diverted from the criminal justice system. Using the criminal justice system for therapeutic leverage was a component of a broader investment in prevention and treatment-in "demand reduction," as it came to be called. Perhaps the most important federal legislative initiative during this period was the Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972.56 This pathbreaking law not only set up SAODAP within the White House for the specific purpose of focusing on prevention and treatment, 57 but also enveloped substance abuse treatment in a nearly airtight cloak of confidentiality as a means of assuring that the patients' health information would be protected, and thereby drew people into treatment voluntarily rather than having to push them into treatment through coercion.
58

C. The Libertarian Approach
A third intellectual thread of the discourse of drug policy reform during the 1960s was the libertarian approach. According to this perspective, people have a right to control their bodies and minds and a "right to be different," 59 and these rights encompass a right to use drugs for "self-defined" purposes, including intoxication. 6° Obviously, this position is explicitly ideological, not pragmatic, and, quite frankly, it has never had any traction in the policy arena. Indeed, libertarian rhetoric has mainly served to contaminate the more pragmatic arguments of reform by giving defenders of the current policy an easy target, and enabling them to tar the more pragmatic position with the same brush that they criticize the libertarian position.
or (1971) . In order to protect "fundamental rights and liberties of individuals" there must be a Therapeutic Bill of Rights that reflects "differing patients, goals, and methods of treatment .... " Id. at 402. The Therapeutic Bill of Rights reflects "Man's innate right to remain free of excessive forms of human modification" and his ability to act upon his "fundamental rights and liberties." Id.
60. See BONNIE & WHITEBREAD, supra note 15, at 118 (noting that early drug policy likely failed to address "the use of drugs for pleasure or other self-defined purposes"); JACOB SULLUM, SAYING YES: IN DEFENSE OF DRUG USE (2003) (discussing various arguments for and against drug use, including "the desire to alter one's consciousness"). See generally DOUGLAS N. HUSAK, DRUGS AND RIGHTS 44-51 (1992) (discussing the rights associated with recreational use of drugs).
II. THE REGRESSIVE PERIOD
It has been widely recognized that the reform period was short-lived. Indeed, it came to an end during the late 1970s and was followed by a repressive "war on drugs" for two decades. 61 The war on drugs was predicated on a belief that unyielding reliance on criminal punishment and other sanctions and social disapproval ("zero tolerance") was necessary to suppress drug use. 62 Under this view, any policy or social practice that tolerates drug use is thought to encourage it, and strong punishments by the criminal law are regarded as absolutely essential. It is self-evident that this moralistic perspective rejects all of the reform perspectives described above. 63 The war-on-drugs approach eschews not only a rights-oriented libertarian view, but also rejects the self-restraint in the use of criminal sanctions and incarceration that is a cardinal feature of the decriminalization perspective. Finally, it also rejects the medical approach to the extent that allowing treatment in lieu of punishment could weaken the message of zero tolerance.
64
After twenty years, the pendulum is finally swinging away from the uncompromising ideologically-driven premise of the war on drugs and zero tolerance. The costs of the war in lives as well as treasure have been very high, and the benefits are at best difficult to assess. 65 In 2001, the National Research Council, an arm of the National Academy of Sciences, issued an important report on drug policy. 66 The study committee, on which I served, had been directed to assess the adequacy of the data and research for making informed drug policy. 67 The committee pointed out that the evidence base for policy-making was relatively strong on the demand side because the pertinent National Institutes of Health and other federal agencies, especially the Substance Abuse and Mental Health Services Administration (SAMHSA), had invested a great deal of funding to assess the efficacy and effectiveness of prevention interventions and treatments for addiction. 68 In contrast, the committee pointed out that virtually no evidence exists [VOL. 13:7 with respect to the effectiveness of measures being taken on the supply side, not only regarding the effects of enforcement on price and availability but also regarding the effects of locking up hundreds of thousands of people who sell or use drugs. 69 There was, and is, very little research and very little evidence of effectiveness of the drug policies on which billions of dollars are spent every 70 year.
The committee was charged only with assessing the science base for making drug policy, not with making policy recommendations. 71 However, the committee did ask, rhetorically, how the government could have implemented a policy of this scope, expending tens of billions of scarce public dollars every year (with major collateral effects on peoples' lives) without making any effort to assess its 72 effectiveness. We characterized the government's indifference to this lack of evidence as "unconscionable," as indeed it is. It is long since time to return to the more pragmatic, evidence-based perspective that was ascendant for about a decade in the late 1960s and 1970s. How should we go about resurrecting and implementing this approach today?
III. SOME IMPLICATIONS The argument in this Article entails many changes in drug policy, including a much more hard-headed look at the gains and costs of alternative enforcement strategies. However, this Article will concentrate on three basic implications regarding the treatment of addiction.
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The first implication has to do with vocabulary, which is extremely important in policy discourse. Consider, for example, the significance of recent discussions about whether the nation is undertaking a "bailout" of the financial system or a "rescue plan" for the American economy. 75 Vocabulary has proven to be especially It's time to banish the word "bailout" from our financial journalism vocabulary. The press's overuse and misuse of this pejorative, misleading word accounts for part of Washington's difficulty in crafting a plan to stabilize credit markets .... Call it a lifeline, a stabilization plan, a buyout-anything but a bailout. It's no sweet deal for Wall Street. But it is indeed a important in the context of drug policy because progressive positions seem always to be successfully characterized as being more radical than they are. 76 For example, the Commission purposely selected the term "decriminalization" as a way of clearly distinguishing the policy it was recommending from "legalization."
77 The
Commission specifically rejected the view that marijuana should be lawfully available for non-medical use (legalization), and recommended instead that the prohibition against cultivation and distribution for non-medical purposes should remain in force. 78 However, we saw no strong reason to criminalize people who do obtain the drug for their own use despite the efforts that society has undertaken to keep it from them. 79 Arresting, prosecuting, and punishing people for using marijuana is much too costly a strategy for deterring the use of the drug; instead we should rely on instruments of social control other than criminal sanctions. 80 Hence, we used the term decriminalization. 81 Recognizing the possibility that the term could be misunderstood, we also used the phrase "partial prohibition" to describe 82 our approach. It turns out, of course, that the critics of our position characterized it as legalization in order to make it seem more radical. 83 In effect, calling it legalization aligns the cost-cutting, prudent, pragmatic approach of decriminalization with the libertarian position.
84
As can be easily seen, a key issue in drug policy discourse is determining who controls the vocabulary. 85 The challenge is to find exactly the right words to send the message that one is trying to convey. For instance, a key issue for addiction policy is embedded in the vocabulary of "disease" and the vocabulary of rescue-a rescue of everyone who is involved in the U.S. economy, as a worker, small investor, pensioner or saver.
Id.
76. See The second implication is that a core aim of addiction policy should be to do what the 1972 Act was designed to do--to create incentives and opportunities for people with addictions to choose to seek addiction treatment on their own. 8 Treatments known to be effective should be available and, given the high social cost of addiction and drug abuse, should be subsidized. 89 The third implication is that, although criminal sanctions for addicted offenders should be retained, therapeutic leverage through the criminal justice system should be broadly encouraged and funded. 90 This approach revives a key element of the progressive approach that was implemented during the 1970s. 9 1 This change is already well underway; 92 however, it should be reinforced and intensified. 93 The following sections discuss each of these three claims in a bit more depth.
A. The Vocabulary of Addiction
For over a decade, the scientific leadership of the addiction field has been waging a broad dissemination campaign to bring advances in our understanding of the neuroscience of addiction to professional and public attention-within medicine, among opinion-makers, and among the general public. 94 This campaign has a motto: "Addiction is a Brain Disease." 95 The core message was reflected in The characterization of addiction as a "brain disease" has been contested. 97 In my view, it is best understood as a political statement rather than a scientific claim. 98 To say that addiction is a brain disease is useful as a rhetorical tool in a debate about public policy; but, scientifically, it is both incomplete and premature. 99 It is incomplete because it fails to communicate the whole story about the behavioral and contextual components of addiction.
1 00 Behavioral components are much more substantial in addiction than in Alzheimer's disease, Parkinson disease, epilepsy, or schizophrenia.
10
' It is premature because research has not connected the observed changes in the brain to behavior.
1 0 2 After all, Dr. Leshner found it necessary to speak metaphorically because we cannot yet speak scientifically.
1 0 3 It is still not possible to explain the mechanisms and processes in the brain that transform controlled use of drugs to addiction.'°4 Notwithstanding its scientific shortcomings, I embrace the characterization of addiction as a brain disease as a political statement; medicalization of addiction (as a policy choice) will have salutary effects on the lives of people enmeshed in drug use and on society, whether or not this term captures the full complexity of the condition. [VOL. 13:7 treatment must take into account the high probability of relapse-and our society should be investing more resources in treatment while reducing its expenditures on incarceration and enforcement. 1°6 Moreover, continued investment in research is likely to pay off in therapeutic advances, although there is likely to be no "biological fix" for addiction.
10 7
One prominent rhetorical feature of the campaign needs much more careful scrutiny, however-the issue of "voluntariness. 
2010]
Addiction
What is meant when it is said that drug use becomes involuntary after "the switch is flipped"? Does the disease cause drug use in the way that a brain lesion causes epileptic seizures or loss of cerebral blood flow causes loss of consciousness? This is the language of mechanism, and the language of choice or voluntariness has no place. 115 Nevertheless, something more is involved with addiction than mechanism.
11 6 Addiction is "not just a brain disease." ' 1 17 The link between brain and behavior is mediated through consciousness. 11 8 Thus, to characterize an addict's drug use as "involuntary" and symptomatic of disease is quite different from describing a seizure as involuntary; in terms of responsibility, this is a very important distinction.
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Even within the realm of conscious experience, there are situations where we properly say that a person has no real choice (like grasping the edge of a cliff, where the inevitable effects of muscular fatigue will prevail, no matter how hard the victim chooses to resist). 120 This, however, is the language of mechanism. But this is not what is meant by loss of control in addiction; instead the term means that due to neurobiological processes deep in the brain over which the addict no longer has any control, he is experiencing a strong need for or desire for substance, and that this need is so great that it is unlikely that he will be able to resist it. 12' This is the language of choice and compulsion rather than mechanism and causation.
122
The addict has a choice, just as a person experiencing "duress" ("push the button or I'll kill you") has a choice. 123 ; see also Morse, supra note 97, at 5 (noting that the brain disease model of addiction suggests that the addict has no control once prolonged use has caused the pathology).
121. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407. But see Michael Louis Corrado, Addiction and Responsibility: An Introduction, 18 LAW & Pf-uL. 579, 581 (1999) (noting that, although it is generally stated that addicts cannot help themselves, they are nonetheless conscious of their actions and choose to act in that manner).
122. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; see also Morse, supra note 97, at 12-13 (describing compulsive as the key term).
123. Bonnie, supra note 74, at 407; see also Morse, supra note 97, at 31-32 (applying the defense of duress as a model for excuse based on "disorders of desire"); cf Corrado, supra note 121, at 584 (noting that addiction as duress exists when the addict uses his drug to rationally avoid pain as opposed to rationally pursue greater pleasure).
[VOL. 13:7 "impairments of volition," rather than "involuntary behavior."
1 24 This important conceptual distinction is needed to connect scientific and clinical ideas about addiction (and other pathological conditions involving so-called compulsions, such as obsessive compulsive disorders) to the vocabulary of responsibility.
125
Relapse
The nature of relapse is another issue too easily blurred by the brain disease rhetoric. Even after detoxification and a period of abstinence, addicts have a strong susceptibility to relapse. In fact, forty to sixty percent of patients treated for addiction relapse within a year, 126 and the rate is highest for tobacco addiction.1
27
Many suggest that this tendency to relapse is not voluntary because the person has no control over conditioned responses associated with previous drug-taking. As one group of leading addiction researchers explains: [One neurobiological] explanation for [addicts'] tendency to relapse lies in the integration of the reward circuitry with the motivational, emotional and memory centers that are co-located within the limbic system. These interconnected regions allow the organism not only to experience the pleasure of rewards, but also to learn the signals for them and to respond in an anticipatory manner. Repeated pairing of a person (drug-using friend), place (coiner bar), thing (paycheck), or even an emotional state (anger, depression) with drug use can lead to rapid and entrenched learning or conditioning. Thus, previously drug-dependent individuals who have been abstinent for long periods may encounter a person, place or thing that previously was associated with their drug use, producing significant physiologic reactions such as withdrawal-like symptoms and profound subjective desire or craving for the drug. These responses can combine to fuel the "loss of control" that is considered a hallmark of drug dependence. Does it make sense to characterize relapse as "involuntary" under these circumstances? The physiologically conditioned feelings may be involuntarily aroused, and relapse may be made more likely by this conditioning and the accompanying neurobiological changes. 129 But the addict is not an automaton, responding mindlessly to the environmental cues. 130 Instead, the addict has a strong predisposition or vulnerability to relapse.'31 Of course, relapse is not inevitable and its likelihood can be reduced if the addict will choose to avoid the contexts or environments that tend to trigger relapse and will choose to seek and adhere to treatment.1 32 Note that this discussion simultaneously uses the probabilistic vocabulary of causation and the individual-centered language of choice. Clinically speaking, the experience of compulsion is the experience of feeling that one must choose to do something in order to avoid pain or dysphoria. 133 Similarly, whether a particular individual can avoid relapse is at least partly affected by whether he or she chooses to take precautions, such as to avoid exposure to the environmental cues.'
34
The central claim in this Article is that the concepts of disease and choice are compatible, and that the law, which is based on our shared moral intuitions, can easily incorporate advances in our understanding of the neural substrates of addiction. 135 The advances amend, but do not displace, the vocabulary of choice.
B. The Case for Subsidizing Treatment
Public policy needs to create incentives and opportunities for people addicted to drugs to choose treatment. Treatment can work, as shown by the abundant evidence of cost-effectiveness.' 36 The legal structure that is needed for increasing access has been in place since 1972.137 The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act was probably the most important statute enacted during the short era of enlightened and progressive drug policy. 138 Yet most people who need treatment are not seeking it. SAMHSA has estimated that about one-in-ten people with serious substance abuse problems (2.3 million of 21.2 million) received treatment in 2007. 139 The available services are not easily accessible to those who do seek it due to waiting lists and inconvenience, !40 and the services offered are typically too thin and therefore not as effective as they could be.
4 1 The simple fact is that funding has never been sufficient and addiction treatment has never been adequately mainstreamed as a component of health care, a problem also associated with mental health care. 1 42 In addition, parity in insurance is a huge development but will not get us where we need to be, mainly because the vast majority of people with severe addictive disorders-especially cocaine and opiate addictions--do not have private insurance. 143 In any given year, about twenty-five percent of the payment for substance abuse treatment is by private insurance.
144 If the nation ever commits itself to universal access to health care as a right, 145 perhaps we can then be reasonably confident that it will include addiction. 146 In the absence of universal health insurance, however, the policy question is whether public funds should be used to subsidize more accessible and better treatment for people who lack insurance. 147 In short, the best argument for subsidizing drug abuse treatment today is not that people with addiction should have the same access to treatment as people with other health conditions-that is not good enough in the absence of universal coverage.
14 8 Instead, treatment for addiction should be available to everyone who needs it because treatment is known to be cost-effective and the social cost of untreated addiction is very high.1 However, the strategy focuses its discussion of providing treatment to criminal offenders.
152 This is a step forward, to be sure, but the report does not even mention the importance of helping people find their way into treatment voluntarily and providing the necessary services. This was, in fact, the core insight of the 1972 Act. 153 It is in society's interest to make addiction treatment genuinely accessible to people who want to regain control over their lives.'
54 Providing treatment when they are in the criminal justice system is a good idea, but a criminal arrest should not be the ticket to otherwise inaccessible addiction treatment services.
C. The Residual Role of Criminalization
Finally, what is the proper role of criminalization? Incarcerating hundreds of thousands of drug users has been a costly mistake, as many state governments have finally recognized. 155 Providing treatment alternatives to criminal punishment was a key component of the strategy of the 1970s 1 56 that was eroded during the 1980s and early 1990s. 157 Finally, this sound policy has been revived. 158 In fact, more than two thousand drug courts have been established since 1995,159 and conditional dispositions linked to drug treatment are also available in ordinary criminal courts. 1 6 0
Returning to the conceptual and moral puzzle that lies at the heart of our current policies toward addicted offenders, one must ask: if addiction really is a brain disease characterized by loss of control over drug-taking, how can we justify punishing addicted offenders for yielding to that compulsion? This question was much debated in the 1960s and 1970s and was addressed in a somewhat unsatisfying way by the Supreme Court in the 1960s in two pivotal decisions, in which a closely divided Court refused to constitutionalize the defense of "compulsion" for addicts. 1
61
Although the issue has not received much attention in the courts over the past forty years, the case for excuse based on volitional impairment has only gotten stronger, as developments in neuroscience continue to elucidate ways in which the addicted brain is different from the non-addicted brain, and the ways in which the genes of people who are susceptible to addiction differ from those who are not. Research Program on Law and Neuroscience to use addiction as a primary case study on the implications of scientific advances in neuroscience for doctrines of criminal responsibility. 163 It will surely come as no surprise that many philosophers and law professors question the moral basis for criminalization of use-related offenses by addicted offenders. 164 And they are supported in this position by leading addiction scientists who question the "voluntariness" of drug use by addicts and see reduced reliance on criminal sanctions as a desirable step along the path to a more therapeutic and less stigmatizing approach to addiction.'
65
It is still important to think about the wisdom of the position that addiction should be a defense to possession and other drug use-related offenses. Who would have such a defense? Who would count as an addict? And what about the continuing grip of addiction after detoxification? Would addicts who were clean but relapsed have a defense? Moreover, presumably the same argument that erases responsibility also establishes the basis for involuntary commitment. Would it make sense to displace the current regime of criminal sanctions as applied to addicts with a regime of civil commitment and coerced treatment? And what sort of treatment can be compelled? Would we want to coerce people to take the anticraving pharmacotherapies that are being developed?
We should not be trying to erase responsibility for addiction. As any sensible addiction therapist will say, the goal of treatment is to get the patient to accept responsibility for avoiding relapse and for getting help when temptations arise.'
66
What is not often recognized, however, is that characterization of addiction as a chronic relapsing disorder like diabetes or asthma, or even bipolar disorder, highlights the issue of personal responsibility that is at the heart of chronic disease management. 167 As previously noted, a key objective of addiction policy should be to provide the incentives and opportunities for addicted people (and people vulnerable to addiction) to choose to help themselves.'
68
What then is the role of criminal sanctions under a pragmatic drug policy? The virtue of criminalization is that it provides an instrument for exercising therapeutic leverage. The threat of getting caught up in the criminal justice system might also serve a useful deterrent function by prodding people who are losing control to seek help on their own, but one should not rest the case for criminalization on deterrence alone. Instead, the argument should emphasize the leverage function because it is one of the reasons that the use of the criminal justice system is preferable to civil commitment-the only available legal alternative for getting addicts into treatment. 169 The distinction here is between coerced treatment and leveraged treatment. Arresting addicted offenders and giving them a choicetreatment in lieu of the usual disposition-is preferable to ordering them to undergo treatment or, if long-acting pharmacotherapies are developed, forcibly administering it to them. 70 
CONCLUSION
In sum, although it may first appear as a regressive view, we cannot destigmatize either drug use or addiction altogether. Criminalization of consumptionrelated offenses is legitimate-both as an instrument of deterrence and prevention for non-addicted offenders and, most importantly, as an instrument of therapeutic leverage for addicted offenders. 171 The ultimate aim of addiction policy is to create incentives and opportunities for people with addictive disorders (or people who are fearful of their vulnerability to addiction) to choose to get help on their own. 172 Therefore, the primary strategy should not be criminalization;
173 instead, the strategy should focus on increasing access to treatment that works and taking steps to draw people into the treatment system voluntarily-or, more accurately, in TreatmentO8 .pdf ("For many people, drug abuse becomes chronic, with relapses ... occur[ring] at rates similar to those for other well-characterized, chronic medical illnesses .... Like people with diabetes or heart disease, [drug addicts] will also need to change their behavior to adopt a more healthful lifestyle."). 169. See WEISSMAN, supra note 19, at 252-53 (describing civil commitment schemes and enumerating criticisms of civil commitment, including procedures for certification and release of the addict, length of the civil commitment process, availability and quality of treatment, and effectiveness). response to the therapeutic leverage that is exercised by family members and employers. 174 Moreover, when effective pharmacotherapies emerge, we ought to subsidize their use. 17 5 Over time, we ought to be able to reduce our reliance on the criminal justice system substantially.
For now, though, the continued use of leveraged treatment through the criminal justice system is the most sensible policy because it would help us achieve the goals of drug policy more effectively overall than any alternative approach. 176 The virtue of pragmatism in drug policy is that it focuses our attention on what works best.1 77 Development of effective medications is an essential part of that strategy.' 78 A key aim of drug policy in the coming years is to increase use of effective pharmacotherapies for offenders in the criminal justice system.' 79 There is every reason to believe that the science will move forward. 180 We also need to design drug policy to take maximum advantage of therapeutic advances when they occur, which means making novel treatments available when they are shown to be cost-effective and subsidizing their use when people are uninsured or underinsured. 
